Malware Detection in the Cloud under Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition by Marnerides, A et al.
Malware Detection in the Cloud under Ensemble
Empirical Mode Decomposition
Angelos K. Marnerides∗§, Petros Spachos†, Periklis Chatzimisios‡, and Andreas U. Mauthe§
∗School of Computing & Mathematical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK
a.marnerides@ljmu.ac.uk
†Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
petros@comm.utoronto.ca
‡Department of Informatics, Alexander TEI of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
pchatzimisios@ieee.org
§InfoLab21, School of Computing & Communications, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
a.marnerides2,a.mauthe@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract—Cloud networks underpin most of todays’ socio-
economical Information Communication Technology (ICT) envi-
ronments due to their intrinsic capabilities such as elasticity and
service transparency. Undoubtedly, this increased dependence of
numerous always-on services with the cloud is also subject to
a number of security threats. An emerging critical aspect is
related with the adequate identification and detection of malware.
In the majority of cases, malware is the first building block
for larger security threats such as distributed denial of service
attacks (e.g. DDoS); thus its immediate detection is of crucial
importance. In this paper we introduce a malware detection
technique based on Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition
(E-EMD) which is performed on the hypervisor level and jointly
considers system and network information from every Virtual
Machine (VM). Under two pragmatic cloud-specific scenarios
instrumented in our controlled experimental testbed we show that
our proposed technique can reach detection accuracy rates over
90% for a range of malware samples. In parallel we demonstrate
the superiority of the introduced approach after comparison with
a covariance-based anomaly detection technique that has been
broadly used in previous studies. Consequently, we argue that
our presented scheme provides a promising foundation towards
the efficient detection of malware in modern virtualized cloud
environments.
Index Terms—Malware Detection, Empirical Mode Decompo-
sition, Cloud computing, Anomaly Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, cloud networks have emerged as vital com-
ponents that contribute to the adequate operation of heavily
intensive data processing and management tasks that provide
the foundation for a number of always-on services offered
to the end-user. There have been extremely large investments
from companies such as Google, Facebook, eBay, Microsoft
and Yahoo! on their data centers in order to support cloud
services that aim to exploit all the capabilities offered by vir-
tualized environments [1]. Nevertheless, as pointed in [3] cloud
environments are subject to a number of security threats that
aim to exploit security holes contained within their intrinsic
capabilities such as service transparency and elasticity. Hence,
a great challenge that persists in cloud networks is related with
the adequate detection of anomalous activities caused either by
legitimate or malicious intent. In particular, the detection of
malware is extremely critical since malware is in the majority
of cases the first point of initiation for larger attacks such as
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [2].
Given the rapid and fairly recent emergence on large-scale
deployments of cloud services, cloud security and particularly
malware detection has not yet been excessively addressed
by the research community. A significant portion of studies
that attempted to formulate security mechanisms (e.g. [4],
[5]) aimed to adjust the performance of traditional Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) under signature rule-based strategies
that employ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on network packets.
In parallel, work in [6], [7] managed to monitor system-related
features on the Virtual Machine (VM) level by employing
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) methods in order to
analyse and detect threats on the VM Operating System (OS).
Despite some important experimental outcomes derived by
the aforementioned studies, none of them aimed to manifest
a holistic detection strategy that considers both system and
network information as seen on each VM. Moreover, the
greatest majority of these studies were instrumented by rule-
based detection policies that depend on pre-defined signatures.
Hence, their ability at adapting on new types of anomalies
which are anticipated to appear in cloud environments [3]
is extremely limited. Therefore, some approaches went be-
yond the pitfalls of signature-based techniques and composed
strategies that rely on statistical anomaly detection schemes
(e.g. [2], [8], [9]). However, as with signature-based techniques
these approaches addressed (up to a reasonably good level)
the identification and detection of anomalies by considering
only a single source of information which was either from the
network or the system.
In this paper, we provide a malware detection methodology
that considers both system and network information as gath-
ered by the hypervisor level of a physical node where multiple
VMs operate. Within a controlled experimental cloud testbed
we report results that consider the scenario of detecting the
Kelihos and Zeus malware samples under two pragmatic cloud
scenarios which have been derived after fruitful discussions
with real cloud operators. We have selected these particular
malware samples and their variants since it has been identified
as quite recent and evolving threats for a range of Windows OS
flavors that have already compromised more than 3.6 million
machines worldwide between 2010 and 2014 due to their
varying and sophisticated evasion techniques as well as their
stealthy propagation1. Nonetheless, in order to comply with the
requirements derived by discussions with cloud operators we
initially perform VM “sanitization” by detecting these types
of malware on a static scenario without live migration and we
subsequently emulate migration of an infected VM between
two physical hosts. The novelty behind our scheme lies on
the consideration of both system and network monitoring at
the hypervisor level of a physical node that runs multiple
VMs. In addition we further contribute by illustrating the
composition of a generic anomaly detection framework that
can sufficiently aid malware detection in the cloud and we
show its superiority over a commonly used Covariance-based
approach. The introduced detection method depends heavily
on the data-driven Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition
(E-EMD) algorithm in order to first characterize each individ-
ual network or system feature since most of them demonstrate
highly non-linear and non-stationary properties. To the best to
our knowledge this particular algorithm has not been used in
the context of cloud networks and explicitly for the aspect
of malware detection and we argue that the results reported
herein also justify its superiority from commercial IDS-based
solutions since the overall detection scheme does not rely on
a-priori knowledge of malware signatures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the data and the experimental scenarios
employed in our work whereas section III provides a brief
description of the E-EMD-based and the Covariance-based
detection methodologies as well as the metrics for assessing
their performance. Section IV is dedicated at discussing the
results obtained throughout our analysis. Finally, section V
summarizes and concludes this paper.
II. DATA & EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The conducted experiments were achieved within a con-
trolled environment in order to regulate them and have a
robust ground truth regarding the normal behaviour of our
setup in the same way that cloud providers have this em-
pirical knowledge in real intra-cloud settings. Both scenarios
described in this section were based on discussions we had
with operators from cloud providers in the UK as being part
of the activities of the India-UK Advanced Technology Centre
(IU-ATC) project [10].
A. Data Measurements
Through our previous work in [2] we have managed to build
a measurement and monitoring facility using a range of moni-
1The Kelihos malware has been firstly detected in 2010 and since then it
has evolved with new variants that perform a range of attacks such as phishing
and spamming [12]. The first Zeus malware instant was detected in 2010 [14]
but since then there is a plethora of new variants that even recently (July
2014) compromised millions of machines and enabled a botnet that could
steal sensitive banking information [13].
toring and post-processing scripts that employ Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) in order to gather system-specific features
(e.g. process list, count of threads etc.) for every VM that
runs on a given physical host. In parallel, we were able to
capture volume-based network traffic features (e.g. counts of
packets/bytes, flows) from every VMs’ network interface and
further aggregate that information with the system features
gathered by our VMI approach. Hence, our dataset can be seen
as a joint set of a total of 55 network and system features on
the hypervisor level that gives a summarizing measurement
view for every VM under a sampling rate of 3 seconds for
each measurement2.
B. Static Malware Analysis: Experimental Setup
An initial concern of any cloud provider relates with the
aspect of VM “sanitization” in order to comprehend the system
and network features of a running VM and further identify on
whether it is infected with malware or any malicious process.
Thus, our first experiment explicitly addresses this aspect by
injecting malware on a given VM that provides an HTTP
service to multiple client requests.
Overall, this experiment lasted for 10 minutes and we have
injected the Kelihos and Zeus malware on separate experi-
mental runs around the 9th minute. As indicated by Fig. 1 the
testbed for the static malware analysis is composed of a single
physical node (Host A) running multiple VMs. The host runs
Xen 4.1 [15] with the XAPI toolstack and Ubuntu 12.10 Linux
as the hypervisor (i.e. dom0 in Xen terminology) operating
system. The VMs used for testing were running Windows XP
(SP3) with some regular user activity (e.g. Internet browsing)
and the VM that was infected provides HTTP service by
virtualizing an HTTP Apache server. In order to generate
some realistic background traffic we have written some custom
scripts on other hosts within the same LAN that enable the
random generation of HTTP requests to that server3. Given the
earlier description of our data measurements (section II-A), we
obtained a joint network and system dataset that represented
the aggregate of activities in all the VMs running on Host A
and we have subsequently analysed the dataset based on the
methodology that we describe in section III.
C. Malware Analysis & VM migration: Experimental Setup
Cloud providers are heavily concerned with the security
implications disclosed under the scenario of VM/service “live”
migration from one physical host to the other. In contrast with
“cold” migration, live migration is an extremely important
functionality contained within any cloud resource manage-
ment strategy and is mainly executed for resource allocation
purposes on real time. We have explicitly aimed to emulate
live migration since the greatest majority of commercial cloud
2The 3 seconds sampling rate was the lowest sampling rate that could
be achieved by the Volatility [11] tool and, thus, we had also to adjust our
network measurements on that rate.
3The employed client scripts were mainly derived by the implementation
of iperf clients and they included random bursty and “lightweight” requests
with varying content and flow size.
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Fig. 1. Visualization for the experimental setup for static malware analysis.
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Fig. 2. Visualization for the experimental setup for malware analysis under
VM migration.
management software (e.g. VMWare VSphere [16]) employ
this functionality by default.
Each experimental run under the migration scenario had
a total duration of 20 minutes and malware was injected on
Host A around the 5th minute whereas the live migration to
host B for the VM that run the HTTP server was initiated on
the 9th minute. As Fig. 2 demonstrates, the testbed for the
migration scenario consists of four physical nodes where one
of them emulates the management entity and is in charge of
regulating the migration activities between Host A and Host
B. The management host as well as hosts A and B run Xen
4.1 with the XAPI toolstack having Ubuntu 12.10 Linux as the
hypervisor operating system. Similarly with the static analysis
experiment described earlier (section II-B) we created custom
scripts running on a different machine that were randomly
generating HTTP requests to the HTTP server that run on the
dedicated VM on Host A. The resulting dataset was composed
by the aggregation of the measurements obtained from both
hypervisors on hosts A and B and also the tcpdump logs
captured at the network interfaces of all the VMs residing
on each host.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the basic principles behind the
proposed E-EMD-based detection technique as well as the
covariance-based approach used for comparison. In addition,
this section also presents the detection performance metrics
used throughout the evaluation of this work.
A. EMD & E-EMD Overview
The Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition (E-EMD)
technique has been used in a range of studies for signal
analysis (e.g. [18], [17]) and is derived by the Empirical Mode
Decomposition (EMD) algorithm that was firstly proposed
as a fundamental building block of the Hilbert-Huang trans-
form [19]. Overall, the EMD algorithm is a data-driven method
that can sufficiently decompose and describe non-linear and
non-stationary data. Hence, they can extract meaningful insight
regarding the internal structure of a given signal or timeseries
that represent data measurements. In particular, it considers the
local characteristics (i.e. local minima, maxima and envelopes)
of a signal on a given time window and further decomposes it
into a small number of Intrinsic Mode Functions (IMFs) that
yield intantaneous frequency representations with respect to
time. A new mode is considered as an IMF if it satisfies two
conditions: i) equality or difference at most by one between
the number of extrema and the number of zero crossings; and
ii) throughout the whole signal the mean value of the upper
and lower envelopes is zero.
We particularly use the E-EMD algorithm due to its adaptive
properties at robustly decomposing non-stationary and non-
linear timeseries that hold several subsequent flat values for
some time intervals. The E-EMD overcomes the EMD al-
gorithm due to its incorporation of the measurement noise
factor, thus acting as a Noise-Assisted-Data-Analysis (NADA)
technique.
The initial step of E-EMD is to treat a measurements
timeseries (e.g. the counts of memory reads/writes, the count
of network packets on the VMs network interface) as a
signal x(t) that is composed as an amalgamation of several
observations alongside a measurement random noise for each
observation each time such as the jth ”artificial” observation
may be denoted as:
xj(t) = x(t) + wj(t) (1)
Subsequently the E-EMD algorithm aims to decompose x(t)
into a sum of IMFs as follows:
x(t) =
n∑
j
hj +mn (2)
where a given hj is considered as an IMF if it complies
with the two conditions mentioned earlier and mn is the
residue of x(t) after n IMFs are extracted. However, since
the condition investigation as well as the computation of hj
and mn is contained within an iterative sifting process [19]
we following describe the basic steps behind the E-EMD
algorithm as implemented and illustrated in [19], [17], [18]:
1) Considering a signal x(t) with some measurement white
noise, identify all minima and maxima points.
2) Interpolate4 between minima and maxima in order to end
up with envelopes emin(t) and emax(t).
3) Compute the mean : m(t) = emax(t) + emin(t)/2.
4) Compute detail: h(t) = x(t)−m(t).
4Given the analysis in [18], [17] we use cubic spline interpolation.
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Fig. 3. Decomposition of the count of system reads measurements on a
given VM under the classical EMD.
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Fig. 4. Decomposition of the count of system reads measurements on a
given VM under E-EMD.
5) Iterate on residual m(t) until h(t) is zero mean and
considered as an IMF based on the sifting process.
6) Go back to step 1 until 5 with different noise series.
7) Obtain the (ensemble) means of corresponding final IMFs
and finish the process.
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of E-EMD over the
traditional EMD and further justify its employment within
our detection approach, we provide Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that
demonstrate the decomposition of a given measurement time-
series that describes the average number of memory reads on
a given VM. It is clearly evidenced that the original raw signal
depicted on the top plots in both Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 holds flat
properties and as anticipated the traditional EMD algorithm
could not adequately narrow down that signal in descriptive
IMFs that reach to a monotonic function. In more detail, the
EMD algorithm has produced two IMFs where the last one
is not fully considered as an absolute monotonic function.
On the other hand, the decomposition conducted under the E-
EMD approach has demonstrated a much improved analysis
and produced one more IMF where the last one results into a
monotonic function.
B. Anomaly Detection method
1) General notation: The overall behaviour of a hypervi-
sor M for the full experiment with duration T is determined
by the sum of all the measurement snapshots gathered from
each individual VM that run on the same physical node where
the hypervisor operates:
M =
T∑
t=1
VM(t) (3)
We define a snapshot of measurements on a given VM on time
t as follows:
VM(t) =
f1(τ) f2(τ) · · · fn(τ)... ... . . . ...
f1(t) f2(t) · · · fn(t)
 (4)
where τ is the sampling rate which in our experiments was 3
seconds, t is a complete snapshot of 1 minute and n determines
the number of features which in our case were 55. Thus, each
column on a VM snapshot represents the timeseries for a given
feature f .
2) Normal Behaviour Composition: As already men-
tioned in section II, both our experiments were conducted
within a controlled environment, thus for both scenarios we
could initially gather and characterize normal activity VM
snapshots before the Kelihos malware was injected. Overall,
our aim was to compose a descriptive statistical threshold that
describes normal operation on the hypervisor level. Hence,
we firstly estimate the corresponding IMFs based on the E-
EMD algorithm for each ”normal” VM snapshot, we secondy
compute the correlation matrix between them and we thirdly
establish the normal behaviour threshold based on the sum of
the mean correlation matrices.
In more detail, we denote µ to be the mean vector of the
resulting snapshot IMFs matrix Y (t) 5 for each feature column
f(t) in a VM(t). Having µ for every f(t) we now have a
newly composed matrix X(t) = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µn] that provides
a summarizing IMF description for each VM snapshot. Based
on X(t) we subsequently compute the reference correlation
Cik in order to quantify the behaviour of VM i with VM k
in the same snapshot t that run on the hypervisor M under
normal operation. Given this quantification we then compute a
reference vector that we use in our anomaly detection phase:
Rnormal(t) = Cik (5)
3) Anomaly Detection Phase: For every newly tested
VM snapshot there is a computation of a distance metric
d(t) that aims to describe the deviation from the Rnormal(t)
that we presented earlier. Similarly with the first steps in
the construction of the normal behaviour, every tested VM
snapshot has to firstly be transformed by the E-EMD algorithm
5Due to the fact that some features were shown to be decomposed
by a lesser or one more IMFs than others we had to empirically refine
our initial measurement matrix and work on subset matrices that had the
same dimensions. After computing the summarizing statistics we could then
aggregate all of them together and reconstruct the initial measurement matrix.
The notation we use throughout Section III-B assumes that our matrices hold
the same dimensions.
and then a summarizing computation of the Rtest(t) has to
be performed as done with the Rnormal(t). Given these new
estimations we can then compute d(t):
d(t) =
 k∑
j=1
Wtr|Cj(t)−Rnormal(t)|
 (6)
where k is the number of the testing VMs, and Wtr is a
weight function that is updated on every newly incoming
testing snapshot defined as:
Wtr = Rtest(t)/Rnormal(t) (7)
The actual detection of malicious activity on a given VM
snapshot is performed by using outlier detection under the
Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) test. Hence, a VM is
anomalous if:
d(t) > median (Rnormal(t) + φMAD(Rtest(t))) (8)
where φ seemed to work well when equal to 4 and
MAD(Rtest(t)) = βmedian (|Rtest(t)−median(Rtest(t))|)
(9)
where β is always equal to 1.48.
C. Covariance-based Detection
In the covariance-based approach we comply with earlier
studies (e.g. [2], [20]) and we denote fβ be the number of
features that compose a vector representing the system or
network observation x in such way that x = (f1, · · · , fβ).
Also, let x1, · · · , xn be the number of occurences observed
such as xi = (f i1, · · · , f iβ) where fτ,ji defines the value of
fi in the jth observation on the time instant τ within the
time period Tτ . Given these definitions we aim to describe
jointly the system and network observation in the matrix Xτ
as follows:
Xτ =

fτ,11 · · · fτ,1β
fτ,21 · · · fτ,2β
...
. . .
...
fτ,n1 · · · fτ,nβ
 (10)
Where Xτ has a covariance matrix ΣXτ :
ΣXτ =

σfτ1 fτ1 σfτ1 fτ2 · · · σfτ1 fτβ
σfτ2 fτ1 σfτ2 fτ2 · · · σfτ2 fτβ
...
...
. . .
...
σfτβ fτ1 σfτβ fτ2 · · · σfτβ fτβ
 (11)
In parallel, we define the Eucledian distance between two
matrices ΣXτ with the mean of ΣXτ , µ(ΣXτ ) by variable Dτ :
Dτ = ‖
(
ΣXT1 − ΣXT2
)− µ(ΣXτ )‖ (12)
Dτ determines the anomalous activity that persists within
the gathered system and network observations. As presented
next (i.e. section IV), our experimentation investigated the
difference between the covariance matrices produced for each
of the 1 minute time bins in order to detect deviations and
further pinpoint malware activity.
D. Detection Performance Metrics
The assesment of the accuracy performance for both de-
tection schemes was achieved with the employment of five
widely used metrics [21] constructed by the counts of the
True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN)
and False Negative (FN) labels on every experimental run.
Hence, we computed the accuracy, precision, recall, F-score
and G-mean as follows:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
F score = 2×
(
Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
)
G mean =
√
Precision×Recall
(13)
IV. RESULTS
A. Static Malware Detection
Based on the experimental setup described in section II-B
we have assessed both the E-EMD-based and the Covariance-
based detection approaches under the “static” scenario where
a malware instance is injected on a running VM. As illustrated
by both Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 it is fairly evidenced that the sug-
gested E-EMD-based scheme produces much higher detection
accuracy than the Covariance-based technique.
We witness that the findings for the E-EMD-based approach
as depicted on Fig. 5 demonstrate an average of approximately
90% of detection accuracy throughout all the performance
metrics. Our proposed scheme could adequately detect the
existence of the Kelihos malware with a 100% accuracy in all
metrics where the Covariance-based approach as shown via
Fig. 6 produced dissapointing results with an overall accuracy
of 48%. The highest achieved metric for the Covariance-based
technique was precision with 60% which consequently means
that there is low confidence on whether a flagged anomalous
observation is in reality anomalous due to malware activities
and in parallel if an anomalous event is truly anomalous.
This observation is also justified by the remaining detection
performance metrics of Recall, F-score and G-mean where
the Covariance-based technique had on average a performance
lower than 55%.
Similarly, the detection of the three Zeus variants has shown
to be more efficient under the employment of the introduced
E-EMD-based approach since it has produced extremely better
results than the compared Covariance-based approach. In
particular, it was feasible to detect all three Zeus variants with
an overall accuracy of approximately 90%. Regardless of the
relatively lower Precision and Recall values obtained for the
first and the second variant of the Zeus malware (≈ 85%), the
robustness of the overall detection scheme is justified through
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Fig. 5. Detection performance for the E-EMD-based detection scheme for
the Kelihos malware and for 3 variants of the Zeus malware under a static
scenario.
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Fig. 6. Detection performance of the Covariance-based detection scheme
for the Kelihos malware and for 3 variants of the Zeus malware under a
static scenario.
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Fig. 7. Example of adaptive threshold while detecting the Zeus malware
under the E-EMD-based detection scheme.
the F-score and G-mean metrics which in practise denote
a combinatorial performance of Recall and Precision. The
lower values for the aforementioned variants is directly related
with the explicit operations and activities enforced by those
particular malware samples. Both samples had a completely
different time-wise execution on the local system and they
did not exhibit any networking (e.g. scanning) activity that
would naturally effect the distribution of the volume-based
network flow features (e.g. counts of packets/bytes) included
in the model. Moreover, from the perspective of the system-
oriented features (e.g. virtual memory size) the activity of
those samples was empirically identifiable only for a small
period of time (≈ 0.5 minute) and in contrast with the Kelihos
malware they did not indicate a new process initiated but they
rather “cannibalized” the explorer.exe process in the Windows
OS.
Nonetheless, the performance of the Covariance-based ap-
proach as demonstrated in Fig. 6 has shown to be much lower
than the introduced E-EMD-based technique. However, in the
case of the first Zeus variant it was feasible to reach a score
of 100% for Precision which meant that this technique could
perfectly match an anomalous event with the malware but on
the other hand it exhibited lower values for the rest of the
performance metrics, hence it can be considered as unreliable
from a general viewpoint.
Overall, we argue, that the E-EMD approach provided better
results than the Covariance-based approach due to its ability
at adapting the “normality” threshold according to a weight
function Wtr and also the MAD value of a newly tested
measurement sample as described earlier (section III-B). Fig. 7
demonstrates this adaptive capability of the suggested scheme
by indicating the varying values of the threshold every time a
distance score for each measurement interval is computed.
B. Malware Detection under VM/Service Migration
In order to empower our argument regarding the applica-
bility of the suggested scheme within cloud settings, both
the E-EMD-based and the Covariance-based techniques were
assessed under the scenario of VM/service migration. As
already mentioned, both algorithms in this scenario consider
a much larger volume of observations since there are VM
measurements gathered from an extra physical host.
Likewise with the “static” analysis described earlier as
justified by the results depicted in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 we
observe that the introduced detection technique produces much
better results than the Covariance-based approach. In constrast
with the 55% of overall accuracy obtained by the Covariance-
based approach for detecting Kelihos, our proposed E-EMD-
based technique achieved to reach an accuracy of 90% with
perfect Precision of 100% and extremely high F-score and G-
mean values of 95% and 94% respectively. Similarly, but with
slightly less overall accuracy of 85% and a decreased Recall
of 75% our technique achieved to obtain higher Zeus detection
results than the Covariance-based approach. Despite the low
Recall value, the reliability behind the detection of the Zeus
malware is empowered by the relatively high F-score and G-
mean values of 89% and 93% respectively.
Given the presented results, we conclude that the E-EMD-
based approach performs much better than the commonly used
Covariance-based technique and it can surely be considered as
a good candidate for detection of malware in virtualized cloud
environments. In conjunction with the results obtained from
the static malware analysis presented earlier, we also argue that
the proposed technique also overcomes the limitations derived
by commercial signature-based IDS since it can adequately
detect various types of malware that significantly differ in their
operations without the need of a pre-known signature.
Accuracy Precision Recall F−score G−Mean
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Detection Performance under Migration (Kelihos)
Cla
ss
ific
ati
on
 Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 %
 
 
E−EMD
Covariance
Fig. 8. Detection performance for the E-EMD-based and Covariance-based
schemes for the Kelihos malware under VM migration.
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Fig. 9. Detection performance for the E-EMD-based and Covariance-based
schemes for one of the Zeus malware variants under VM migration.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The virtualized nature of the cloud that enables beneficial
capabilities for cloud services is also prone to several security
threats. In particular, a critical security issue relates with the
adequate identification and detection of malware. In this work
we demonstrate the applicability of an anomaly detection
approach that explicitly addresses the detection of malware
and considers the joint network and system representation of
a VM from measurements gathered at the hypervisor level.
Due to the fact that the greatest majority of the moni-
tored network and system features demonstrate highly non-
linear and non-stationary properties, our proposed scheme
initially employs the E-EMD algorithm in order to facilitate
a robust statistical characterization and decomposition of the
measurement signals. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
our method under two pragmatic cloud scenarios within a
controlled experimental testbed and exhibit the ability of our
technique at detecting the Kelihos and Zeus malware in-
stances with high accuracy rates. Under a thorough comparison
with a commonly used Covariance-based technique this study
demonstrates the superiority of the proposed E-EMD-based
approach since it has exhibited higher detection accuracy with
an average performance of over 90%. The reported results
also imply that the introduced detection technique overcomes
the limitations of commercial IDS-based solutions since it
does not rely on pre-known malware signatures. Overall, we
argue that the outcomes of this work will broaden the horizon
towards the design of intelligent anomaly detection strategies
in cloud environments.
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